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INTRODUCTION
Asked by British journalist David Frost whether the President
of the United States has the ability to authorize illegal acts when
he believes such action is justified, Richard Nixon infamously
replied: “Well, when the President does it, that means it is not il-
legal.”1 A majority of Americans disagreed with the former Pres-
ident’s assessment.2 But the question remains: If the President is
theoretically capable of breaking the law while in office, what is the
best way to determine whether a crime has actually been commit-
ted? This question has forced lawmakers to attempt to reconcile
various investigatory mechanisms—all differing in their independ-
ence from presidential interference—and the constitutional sep-
aration of powers. Previous attempts to resolve the problem by
assigning investigations to the Department of Justice (DOJ), from
the independent counsel system to the current DOJ special counsel,
have attracted vociferous criticisms on constitutional grounds.3
Special counsel investigations have also traditionally lasted for
years,4 with the primary form of public disclosure coming in the
form of criminal indictments.5 So if the public feels that an
1. ‘I Have Impeached Myself ’: Edited Transcript of David Frost’s Interview with Richard
Nixon Broadcast in May 1977, GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2007), https://www.theguardian.com/the
guardian/2007/sep/07/greatinterviews1 [https://perma.cc/G5RE-PBHC].
2. A September 1974 Gallup poll found that 58 percent of the public believed that Nixon
should be criminally charged with regard to his actions in the Watergate scandal. See Andrew
Kohut, How the Watergate Crisis Eroded Public Support for Richard Nixon, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/08/how-the-watergate-
crisis-eroded-public-support-for-richard-nixon/ [https://perma.cc/2HYD-YUC6].
3. For a critique of the independent counsel, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a critique of the special counsel, see Steven G. Calabresi,
Opinion on the Constitutionality of Robert Mueller’s Appointment 1-20 (Nw. Univ. Pub. Law
& Legal Theory Series, Paper No. 18-14, 2018).
4. The Iran-Contra independent counsel investigation lasted seven years, and the
Whitewater investigation lasted eight years. See George Lardner Jr. & Walter Pincus, Iran-
Contra Report Castigates Reagan, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/archive/politics/1994/01/19/iran-contra-report-castigates-reagan/963af142-5b5a-460c-b4f7-
28b7c25fbb25/ [https://perma.cc/6UZE-YVZP]; Neil A. Lewis, Final Report by Prosecutor on
Clintons Is Released, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/21/
us/final-report-by-prosecutor-on-clintons-is-released.html [https:// perma.cc/6W5V-9AKX].
5. The secrecy of the Mueller special counsel team became a running joke in Washington,
with one journalist remarking, “You’d be embarrassed to ask Bob Mueller for a leak.... It’d be
like asking him to watch a porn movie with you.” See Darren Samuelsohn, Robert Mueller Has
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investigation is unwarranted or politically motivated, there is no
way for them to register their disapproval. In a highly partisan
political environment in which investigations of the executive are
likely to continue indefinitely,6 it is necessary to devise a more du-
rable solution.
This Note proposes an alternative solution to the challenge of
conducting executive investigations, one that keeps in mind the dual
goals of sufficient investigatory independence and sufficient public
accountability. Rather than continued efforts to bureaucratize in-
vestigations of the executive by entrusting them to career prosecu-
tors, Congress should instead shoulder the primary responsibility
for initiating investigations and conducting executive oversight.
This role would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s constitu-
tional interpretation and Congress’s own historical practice, and
would help to insulate future investigations from the possibility of
executive interference without infringing on the President’s con-
stitutionally delegated authority over all members of the executive
branch. Such an approach would also be the fastest way to bring
misdeeds to light, thereby serving the public interest in disclosure
and enhancing executive accountability at the ballot box.
This Note will proceed as follows. Part I will describe previous
attempts to institutionalize a formalized system within the execu-
tive branch for investigations of executive misconduct and the
constitutional and practical problems inherent in each. Part II will
describe the history of successful congressional investigations that
inspired the proposed solution—relocating investigative authority
from the executive branch to Congress—and the values of investiga-
tory independence, constitutional faithfulness, and public account-
ability that such an approach would promote. Part III will address
the strongest counterarguments, including concerns over constitu-
tionality, partisanship, and justice.
No Comment, POLITICO (Oct. 2, 2017, 5:01 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/02/
robert-mueller-russia-probe-secret-243345 [https://perma.cc/7TDJ-TLVN].
6. See Jonathan Swan, Scoop: Republicans Secretly Study Their Coming Hell, AXIOS
(Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.axios.com/2018-midterm-elections-republicans-preparation-
investigations-180abf7b-0de8-4670-ae8a-2e6da123c584.html [https://perma.cc/ENM2-MZ22].
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I. HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH INVESTIGATORY MECHANISMS
Investigations into executive branch misconduct that are sim-
ultaneously housed within the executive branch are a relatively
recent invention in America. The DOJ was not created until 1870,7
and Congress continued to dominate the investigatory landscape
throughout the subsequent century.8 This Part will assess the ex-
ecutive branch investigatory mechanisms that were eventually
created, and the problems inherent in each.
A. Flaws of the Independent Counsel System
Before the Watergate scandal, there was no formalized system
in place for conducting investigations into alleged executive mis-
conduct.9 When suspicion of wrongdoing increased to the point that
public pressure became impossible to ignore, the President would
simply appoint a special prosecutor to investigate the matter on an
ad hoc basis.10 This approach raised several obvious concerns, all
rooted in the unitary decision-making authority entrusted to the
President. Deciding whether a given situation warranted the
appointment of a special prosecutor was the President’s sole
responsibility;11 the identity and qualifications of the prosecutor,
if appointed, were left to the President’s discretion;12 and the
President defined the parameters of the investigation once it
7. “By 1870 ... the increase in the amount of litigation involving the United States had
required the very expensive retention of a large number of private attorneys to handle the
workload. A concerned Congress passed the [Judiciary] Act to Establish the Department of
Justice.” See About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/about/ [https://
perma.cc/ZQC8-NZ44].
8. For a list of prominent congressional investigations conducted during this time period,
see A History of Notable Senate Investigations, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artand
history/history/common/briefing/Investigations.htm [https://perma.cc/7JP7-ZST8].
9. See KATY J. HARRIGER, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 15 (2d ed.,
rev. 2000).
10. Id. at 15-19.
11. “As press and public attention mounted ... Pres[ident] Calvin Coolidge began to feel
the pressure to respond and to demonstrate his concern about the charges.” Id. at 15-16.
12. “When [Truman] could not get his first choice to head the commission, he chose
Newbold Morris, a Republican lawyer from New York ... ‘who possessed no political instincts
whatsoever.’” Id. at 17-18.
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commenced.13 Such total trust in the good character of the Com-
mander-in-Chief seems impossibly naïve to modern eyes, but in the
few pre-Watergate instances in which the President utilized this
system, it successfully produced accountability. The special coun-
sels appointed to investigate the Teapot Dome scandal14 success-
fully prosecuted the individuals involved,15 and President Truman
once dismissed his own Attorney General when he attempted to end
a special counsel investigation without first obtaining the Presi-
dent’s approval.16
Watergate changed everything because it revealed the extent to
which the existing special counsel system was vulnerable to re-
taliation from a President who had little incentive to assist an
investigation.17 President Nixon initially agreed to appoint Special
Prosecutor Archibald Cox only because the Senate threatened to
block his appointment of a new Attorney General if he refused,18
and he reconsidered the wisdom of continued compliance with the
investigation after the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
Nixon must turn over “material evidence” consisting of subpoenaed
White House tape recordings for in camera inspection.19 In response,
Nixon proposed a solution to the impasse: he would release edited
summaries of the tapes to the Senate Watergate Committee and
the grand jury.20 
Cox refused to accept this improvisational offer, calling it “non-
complian[t] with the court’s order” in a public press conference and
13. “Truman ... suggested to [Attorney General] McGrath that the new special prosecutor
was reaching beyond his assignment.” Id. at 18.
14. The Teapot Dome scandal involved Secretary of the Interior Albert Fall dispensing
naval oil reserves to private interests and personally profiting about “$400,000 ... illegally
through [the] secret deals.” KENNETH WHYTE, HOOVER: AN EXTRAORDINARY LIFE IN
EXTRAORDINARY TIMES 288 (2017).
15. See HARRIGER, supra note 9, at 17.
16. Id. at 18.
17. If Nixon had not delayed and eventually forced the Supreme Court to override his
claim of executive privilege over subpoenaed evidence, it is unlikely that he would have
remained in office until August of 1974. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-13
(1974) (analyzing Nixon’s constitutional argument).
18. See HARRIGER, supra note 9, at 20.
19. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
20. Warren Weaver Jr., Cox News Conference, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 1973), http://movies2.
nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/1020.html#article [https://perma.cc/E9WQ-
WD3K].
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openly questioning whether the President (as opposed to the At-
torney General) had the constitutional right to order him to do
anything.21 Within hours, Nixon retaliated by ordering his Attorney
General to fire Cox,22 citing as justification Cox’s refusal to accept
Nixon’s offer.23 In his statement announcing the firing, White House
Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler claimed that the President was the
party who acted “to avoid a constitutional confrontation” by pro-
posing an innovative solution that sought to provide the investiga-
tors with the evidence they needed “with the least possible intrusion
of Presidential privacy.”24 Cox’s dismissal, coupled with the si-
multaneous departures of the two top officials at the DOJ,25 pro-
voked a massive public outcry26 and led to the rapid appointment of
a new special prosecutor who guided the investigation to its con-
clusion.27
After Nixon’s resignation, Congress set out to devise a new
system for investigating the executive with the primary objective of
protecting future prosecutors from the possibility of presidential
retaliation.28 The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (the EGA)
21. Id.
22. Douglas E. Kneeland, Nixon Discharges Cox for Defiance; Abolishes Watergate Task
Force; Richardson and Ruckelshaus Out, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 1973), http://movies2.
nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/1020.html#article [https://perma.cc/Z8QM-85AP].
23. For an analysis of Nixon’s use of congressional cooperation in this instance as a shield
against the special prosecutor, see infra text accompanying notes 75-79.
24. Kneeland, supra note 22. On the other hand, “Mr. Cox’s refusal to proceed in the same
spirit of accommodation ... made it necessary for the President to discharge Mr. Cox,”
according to Ziegler. Id.
25. Both Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William
Ruckelshaus refused to fire Cox, and were summarily relieved of their duties. Id. For
Ruckelshaus’s perspective on these events, see William D. Ruckelshaus, A ‘Saturday Night
Massacre’ Veteran Offers Trump Some Advice, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/07/27/opinion/a-saturday-night-massacre-veteran-offers-trump-some-
advice.html [https://perma.cc/S79D-FRDB].
26. “Senior members of both parties in the House of Representatives were reported to be
seriously discussing impeachment of the President ... because of Mr. Nixon’s dismissal of Mr.
Cox.” Kneeland, supra note 22.
27. See John Herbers, Nixon Names Saxbe Attorney General; Jaworski Appointed Special
Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/11/02/archives/nixon-
names-saxbe-attorney-general-jaworski-appointed-special.html [https://perma.cc/H64B-
EMZA].
28. “[The legislation] embodies major reform proposals designed to improve the operation
of the most basic institutions of the Federal Government and to assure the accountability of
public officials.” 123 CONG. REC. 20,956 (1977) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff).
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created the independent counsel, an empowered version of the
special counsel who operated under the aegis of the DOJ and could
only be appointed by a designated panel of federal judges upon the
request of the Attorney General.29 The Attorney General would
make the determination whether an independent counsel was
needed without any input from the President.30 Most importantly,
the EGA restricted the conditions under which the Attorney Gener-
al could dismiss an independent counsel to objectively discernible
situations of “good cause, physical or mental disability ... or any
other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such
independent counsel’s duties.”31 Congress, aiming to restore public
confidence in fair executive oversight, handcuffed future Presi-
dents32 from exercising unreviewable discretion in firing a special
prosecutor while also acting to deter the executive from installing
political allies in the position.33
The first signs of trouble for the independent counsel system
came not from the political branches of government, but from the
courts. In 1988, the Supreme Court ruled eight to one in Morrison
v. Olson that the independent counsel system was constitutional, in
a ruling that has never officially been overturned.34 The majority
held that the statute did not impermissibly undermine the Presi-
dent’s constitutional authority over the executive functions of the
federal government because the ability of the Attorney General to
hire and fire an independent counsel at her discretion “g[a]ve the
29. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 592(c)(1), 92 Stat. 1868
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 592 (2012)).
30. Id.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1). 
32. The legislation was promoted primarily as a response to Watergate, with one senator
noting that it was substantially similar to an unsuccessful prior bill, the Watergate
Reorganization and Reform Act of 1976. See 123 CONG. REC. 20,956 (1977) (statement of Sen.
Ribicoff). When the Senate considered the conference report that constituted the final version
of the bill, the separation of powers implications went unmentioned. See 124 CONG. REC.
34,527 (1978) (statement of Sen. Percy).
33. “The public will much more readily accept the decision of an independent special
prosecutor, who determines that no wrongdoing was committed by high officials, than that
same opinion from an Attorney General who has been called upon to decide the fate of a friend
or associate.” Id.
34. See 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988).
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Executive Branch sufficient control ... to ensure that the President
[was] able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.”35 
Justice Scalia, in the sole dissenting opinion, disagreed.36 In his
view, the EGA impermissibly robbed the President of a portion of
the executive authority granted him under Article II, Section 1,
Clause 1 of the Constitution37 by creating a fully empowered federal
prosecutor whom the President could not control; in fact, such a
modification of the traditional separation of powers structure “[was]
indeed the whole object of the statute.”38 For Justice Scalia, the
constitutional analysis was simple: if the power at issue was one
specifically assigned to the executive (and he believed that the
responsibility for law enforcement indisputably was39), then it was
not a power that Congress had the authority to revoke.40 
Though few agreed with him then, by the time of the Clinton im-
peachment drama, Justice Scalia’s dissent had gained widespread
currency among political elites of both parties.41 After only two
tumultuous decades, bipartisan legislative majorities agreed to let
Congress’s solution expire without fanfare.42 After twenty-one in-
dependent counsel investigations in as many years43 that inflicted
political damage on presidential administrations of both parties,44
35. Id. at 696.
36. Id. at 697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37. This clause is known as the Vesting Clause and stipulates that “[t]he executive Power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
38. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. The textual justification for this belief will be addressed in Part IV.A. See infra text
accompanying notes 112-14.
40. “[Article II, Section 1, Clause 1] does not mean some of the executive power, but all
of the executive power.” Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. “After 10 years of mouldering on law library shelves, the Scalia dissent in Morrison
v. Olson is being cited and passed around in liberal circles like samizdat.” Linda Greenhouse,
Blank Check; Ethics in Government: The Price of Good Intentions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 1998),
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/01/weekinreview/blank-check-ethics-in-government-the-
price-of-good-intentions.html [https://perma.cc/5MCQ-FQJJ].
42. See Helen Dewar, Independent Counsel Law Is Set to Lapse, WASH. POST (June 5,
1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/counsels/stories/counsel0605
99.htm [https://perma.cc/H9DB-NPU4].
43. For records relating to these investigations, see Special Prosecutors and Independent
Counsels Records, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/research/investigations/special-
prosecutors-indept-counsels [https://perma.cc/87GV-G88R].
44. Bill Clinton called his decision to request that Attorney General Janet Reno appoint
an independent counsel to investigate Whitewater “the worst presidential decision I ever
made.” BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 574 (1st ed. 2004).
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most in Washington felt that the treatment had been more painful
than the disease.45 Even if Congress somehow decided to revive the
independent counsel statute today, it is not at all clear that an
increasingly formalist Court would vote to uphold it in the face of a
changed bipartisan consensus.46
B. Flaws of the Special Counsel System
The independent counsel presented practical problems for the
President that stemmed from a fundamental constitutional vio-
lation: an attempt by Congress to remove a subset of the federal law
enforcement apparatus from the President’s direct control. Attorney
General Janet Reno attempted to rectify these flaws in 1999, upon
the expiration of the statute authorizing the office of independent
counsel, by promulgating new regulations that allow the Attorney
General to appoint a special counsel when she believes (1) that a
criminal investigation is warranted and (2) that conducting such an
investigation using ordinary DOJ prosecutorial resources would
present some conflict of interest.47 The Attorney General has
appointed all special prosecutors since 1999, including the most
recent, Special Counsel Robert Mueller, pursuant to these regula-
tions.48
These DOJ regulations fixed the constitutional flaw identified by
Justice Scalia by housing future investigations of the executive
squarely inside of the executive branch, but in her attempt to
respond to that critique, Reno inadvertently created a new
problem—or rather, as evidenced by the case of Richard Nixon,
45. “Many Republicans have long opposed the law.... Democrats’ ardor for the law cooled
rapidly when it was employed against Clinton administration officials, including Clinton
himself.... Even [Independent Counsel Kenneth] Starr has urged that the law be allowed to
lapse.” Dewar, supra note 42.
46. “[A] bipartisan judgment had formed that the Independent Counsel was a kind of
constitutional Frankenstein’s monster, which ought to be shoved firmly back into the ice from
which it was initially untombed.” Adrian Vermeule, Morrison v. Olson Is Bad Law, LAWFARE
(June 9, 2017, 8:14 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/morrison-v-olson-bad-law [https://
perma.cc/YTM8-ZU7X].
47. 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 (2019).
48. ROD J. ROSENSTEIN, OFF. OF THE DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN., APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
COUNSEL TO INVESTIGATE RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
AND RELATED MATTERS (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/967231/download
[https://perma.cc/ 7XJJ-T4C2].
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resurrected an old one. The decision to return special counsel
investigations to the DOJ brought them once more under the au-
thority of the President and removed the special protections that
insulated the independent counsel from political interference.49 In
fact, the current regulations are not even subject to the notice-and-
comment procedures that ordinarily accompany federal rulemaking
“because they relate to ‘matters of agency management or person-
nel,’ and ‘agency organization, procedure, or practice.’”50 
In other words, the decision to fire the special counsel is now an
internal DOJ matter that does not differ in any meaningful way
from the decision to fire any other executive branch employee.51 This
creates a glaring problem for anyone concerned about the inde-
pendence of executive branch investigations and makes it difficult
to hold the President accountable if he has committed a crime.52 The
attempt to respond to the failures of the independent counsel system
by moving towards greater faithfulness to the Constitution and
away from greater investigatory independence has resulted in an
overcorrection that needs to be balanced. The pendulum will keep
swinging between these two bad options unless Congress acts to
remove investigations of the executive from the purview of the
executive branch.
II. THE SOLUTION: CONGRESS AS PRIMARY INVESTIGATIVE
AUTHORITY
In order to avoid the constitutional issues raised by the independ-
ent counsel system and the independence concerns implicated by the
49. “[T]he special counsel regulations can be unilaterally revoked by the very executive
branch that unilaterally created them.” George Conway, The Terrible Arguments Against the
Constitutionality of the Mueller Investigation, LAWFARE (June 11, 2018, 5:54 PM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/terrible-arguments-against-constitutionality-mueller-investigation
[https://perma.cc/WT3G-LMAF].
50. Id. As Conway notes, this “suggests they could be dispensed with equally uncere-
moniously.” Id.
51. See id.
52. It also means that ad hoc, extralegal methods have become the only defenses avail-
able to shield the special counsel from presidential retaliation. See Michael S. Schmidt &
Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When White House Counsel
Threatened to Quit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/us/
politics/trump-mueller-special-counsel-russia.html [https://perma.cc/P3R8-8WEG].
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current system, the primary responsibility for future investigations
of the executive branch should be vested in Congress. This role for
the legislature would not only be responsive to modern concerns
about accountability and independence, but would also be conso-
nant with the historical role of Congress as outlined by the Consti-
tution and interpreted by the Supreme Court. It would also ensure
that alleged executive misdeeds are subjected to public scrutiny,
allowing the electorate to respond accordingly and enforce account-
ability for bad actors at the ballot box.
A. Historical Support for Congressional Investigations
In contrast to investigations by independent and special counsels,
congressional investigations have been a feature of American po-
litical life since the start. Congress’s primary responsibility under
the Constitution is the exercise of “legislative powers,”53 a phrase
defined as “[t]he power to make laws and to alter them.”54 Since long
before the American Revolution, this power has been understood in
Anglo-American law as encompassing the ability to gather perti-
nent facts in order to produce legislation,55 and the first instances
of congressional investigation of the executive branch occurred
during the Washington administration.56 For the founding genera-
tion, congressional investigative power was an unremarkable and
essential outgrowth of the power to legislate.57
Every time that the Supreme Court has weighed in on the ques-
tion, it has affirmed the congressional power to investigate.58 The
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
54. Legislative Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed. 2014).
55. “Although there is no explicit textual grant of investigative power to Congress in the
Constitution, the proposition that a legislative body generally possesses investigative powers
is not controversial as a historical matter.... By 1689, for example, Parliament had numerous
committees in place investigating government operations.” William P. Marshall, The Limits
on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 785.
56. “[T]he early Congress also readily utilized investigative power. Its first occasion to do
so was a House Committee investigation in 1792 of the ill-fated St. Clair expedition....
President Washington did not challenge Congress’s power to investigate the matter.” Id. at
786.
57. See id. at 786-88.
58. For foundational Supreme Court cases in this area, see Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S.
521, 543, 545-46 (1917) (affirming Congress’s power to hold an individual in contempt, but
deciding that Congress was not justified in holding someone in contempt for “irritating and
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seminal opinion on the congressional investigative power is the 1927
case McGrain v. Daugherty, in which the Court was asked to de-
termine whether Congress had the authority to subpoena witnesses
in the course of the Senate investigation into the Teapot Dome
scandal.59 The Court determined that it did, with Justice Van
Devanter writing for a unanimous Court that “the power of in-
quiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function.”60 Subsequent decisions carried
this logic even further, expanding the investigative authority of
Congress to anything implicating “the public interest.”61 In other
words, there is no constitutional requirement that congressional
investigations must end in the creation of new legislation—or even
that they must pretend that such is their objective. They simply
must concern “the public interest,” and the possibility that members
of the executive branch committed crimes unquestionably does.62
B. Dual Congressional/Special Counsel Investigations
But if congressional investigations have existed since the dawn
of the Republic, why can they not continue to exist as a counterpart
to investigations conducted by professional prosecutors? To put it
simply: because they often get in the way, impeding the ultimate
goal of accountability for wrongdoers. The problem arises out of
Congress’s power to immunize witnesses, a necessary outgrowth of
its power to subpoena,63 and one that is codified in federal statute.64
ill-tempered statements” in a letter); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190, 192 (1880)
(holding that “no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House,
unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire”
and that in this case the House of Representatives exceeded the limits of its authority); and
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230-34 (1821) (holding that Congress had the
power to hold an individual in contempt).
59. See Marshall, supra note 55, at 792-95.
60. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).
61. “The informing function of the Congress is in effect ‘a study by the government of
circumstances which seem to call for study in the public interest.’” Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178, 225 (1957) (Clark, J., dissenting) (quoting Hugo L. Black, Inside a Senate
Investigation, 172 HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 1936, at 275, 278).
62. See id.
63. “The Supreme Court has long permitted prosecutors and Congress to overcome a
witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination through the grant
of immunity.” John van Loben Sels, From Watergate to Whitewater: Congressional Use
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When Congress offers immunity to a testifying witness, it prevents
prosecutors from using any part of the witness’s testimony—either
directly or indirectly—in a criminal prosecution of that witness.65
The power to immunize witnesses can ostensibly be used to compel
lower-ranking members of a criminal conspiracy to testify about the
activities of higher-ranking members,66 but that is not always how
events unfold.
The most famous example of congressional immunity run amok
is the Iran-Contra investigation. The Iran-Contra Committee of-
fered immunity to Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and National
Security Advisor John Poindexter, key players in the illegal effort
to divert profits from Iranian arms sales to a Nicaraguan guerilla
movement, due to a misguided belief that their testimony would
expose bigger names within the Reagan administration to criminal
liability.67 In contrast to the practice of the Senate Watergate
Committee, the Iran-Contra Committee did not demand any infor-
mation regarding the substance of North’s testimony in exchange
for the offer of immunity.68 When North’s testimony ultimately ex-
culpated others in the administration, the Committee was left with
no recourse—and the ongoing independent counsel investigation
was caught flat-footed by Congress’s blunder.69
Even the beau ideal of congressional investigations, the Sen-
ate Watergate Committee, temporarily derailed the parallel
Immunity and Its Impact on the Independent Counsel, 83 GEO. L.J. 2385, 2388 (1995).
64. The provision, enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, shields
immunized witnesses from criminal prosecution for information revealed in their compelled
testimony before Congress. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2012); van Loben Sels, supra note 63, at
2388 n.9.
65. van Loben Sels, supra note 63, at 2388-89.
66. See id. at 2389.
67. See id. at 2397-98. “The Democrats in Congress believed that North and Poindexter,
if given immunity, would provide the ‘smoking gun,’ implicating more senior Reagan
administration officials.” Id. at 2398.
68. “[Chief Counsel to the Senate Watergate Committee Sam] Dash believes that initial
questioning of an immunized witness in executive session or deposition is critical to the
success of a congressional investigation.” Id. 
69. See id. at 2399. “[Iran-Contra Independent Counsel] Lawrence Walsh finds fault with
almost every aspect of the Committee’s treatment of North. He believes Congress should
never have granted immunity to North absent a strong indication that he would implicate
superiors.” Id.
586 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:573
investigation of a special prosecutor.70 Initially, the Watergate
Committee succeeded in bringing useful information to light71 in a
way that helped, rather than hindered, the special counsel.72 That
success was achieved because the members of the Committee
decided to condition their grants of immunity on prior disclosure of
witness testimony73—clearly not a decision that all congressional
investigations choose to make.74 But even this exceedingly careful
investigation ran afoul of the special counsel when the Senate
Committee separately negotiated a deal with President Nixon75
whereby he would release edited summaries of subpoenaed tape
recordings to the Committee.76 When the Special Prosecutor reject-
ed this proposal that the Senate Committee was prepared to accept,
he was dismissed.77 Not only had the Senate Watergate Committee
inadvertently provoked a confrontation between the President and
the Special Counsel78 in its eagerness to reach a deal, but it also
provided Nixon with a convenient justification for his decision to
70. A new special prosecutor was appointed within a week and the investigation
proceeded. See Herbers, supra note 27.
71. The existence of the critical White House taping system was first uncovered by the
congressional investigation, not the special counsel. See Senate Watergate Committee Tes-
timony of Alexander Butterfield About Secret Tapes, C-SPAN (June 14, 2018), https://www.
c-span.org/video/?c4735626/senate-watergate-committee-testimony-alexander-butterfield-
secret-tapes [https://perma.cc/4LUL-69SF].
72. See van Loben Sels, supra note 63, at 2396-97. This was primarily due to the efforts
of Chief Counsel Sam Dash, who insisted that each potential witness reveal the substance of
their testimony in closed session so that he could ensure that they “could advance the
investigation by testifying to the acts of other players.” Id. at 2396.
73. See id.
74. “The Iran/Contra Committee ... could not control the public session, because it had no
prior knowledge of North’s testimony. The Committee was forced to gamble that it could get
the explosive testimony it needed from North without the prescreening advantage enjoyed by
the Watergate Committee.” Id. at 2398.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24 for further discussion of this plan.
76. These summaries were supposed to have been authenticated by an ostensibly in-
dependent third party, Senator John Stennis, who claimed to have never consulted with either
the President or the leaders of the Senate Watergate Committee concerning the plan. See
Stennis Says Haste Doomed Tapes Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 1973), https://www.nytimes.
com/1973/10/31/archives/stennis-says-haste-doomed-tapes-plan-his-understanding-
explained.html [https://perma.cc/6FQB-P3ZP].
77. See supra text accompanying notes 17-27 for the full story of Cox’s firing.
78. Cox said that the negotiations between the White House and Congress had created
“insuperable difficulties” for his investigation. Weaver, supra note 20.
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fire Cox.79 Investigations housed solely within the executive branch
might be vulnerable to presidential interference, but investigations
proceeding on two separate tracks in two separate branches are
likely to collide in ways that are damaging to both.
C. How This Proposal Would Work
The congressional investigatory system under this proposal would
kick into action when the Attorney General, after receiving
information concerning potential criminal law violations within the
executive branch,80 refers the matter to the Senate Majority Leader
for further investigation.81 Though the Attorney General has no
power to compel the Majority Leader to act (nor should she), a
public referral from the Attorney General will attract public at-
tention and should prevent the Majority Leader from acting or
failing to act on the basis of partisan considerations.
After receiving the referral, the Senate Majority Leader will
introduce a resolution to appoint a bipartisan committee to investi-
gate the matter. A temporary committee assigned to investigate a
discrete matter is preferred to a permanent committee so that there
will be no incentive to conduct continuous, meritless investigations.
The investigation will be housed in the Senate rather than the
House so that there will be no expectation that it will ultimately
result in impeachment charges for any executive officer. However,
any findings from the Senate investigation could eventually be
referred to the House if the Senate committee uncovers serious
misconduct. Although University of San Diego Professor Michael
Rappaport’s proposal to allow members of each party to appoint the
committee members of the opposite party in order to select for merit
79. In explaining the firing, Press Secretary Ziegler noted that the “action taken by the
President [in proposing a deal] ... was accepted by responsible leaders in Congress.” Kneeland,
supra note 22.
80. The independent counsel system also depended on an initial referral from the Attorney
General, though to the judiciary rather than Congress. See supra text accompanying note 29.
81. The decision to entrust this decision to the Attorney General rather than the Senate
Majority Leader was motivated by the recognition that the Majority Leader holds his position
by dint of his leadership of a partisan faction, whereas the Attorney General leads an
organization dedicated to “ensur[ing] fair and impartial administration of justice for all
Americans.” About DOJ, supra note 7.
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has some appeal,82 it is not clear that it is necessary to go quite that
far. Rather, once each party has selected its desired committee
members, the committee members of each party can be allowed to
select the ranking member of the opposite party that they believe
will best guide the investigation to its conclusion.
The Senate committee will be endowed with the ordinary con-
gressional powers to subpoena, compel testimony, and immunize
witnesses, which are powers beyond those possessed by ordinary
federal prosecutors. Because there is no danger that an immunized
congressional witness’s testimony will be used to deprive them of
their constitutional rights83—and because the goal of a congressio-
nal investigation is not criminal conviction—congressional investi-
gations typically offer fewer constitutional protections for witnesses
than criminal investigations.84 These enhanced investigatory powers
will help ensure the rapid introduction of relevant facts into the
public domain, thereby speeding the progress of the investigation
and allowing voters to draw their own conclusions as to culpability.
III. BENEFITS OF THE PRESENT PROPOSAL
Giving Congress, rather than the DOJ, the responsibility for in-
vestigating allegations of misconduct within the executive branch
would yield a variety of benefits that have not been simultaneously
realized by any previous investigatory mechanism. Housing inves-
tigations in the legislative rather than the executive branch would
ensure that the President has no constitutional authority to end an
investigation when it causes him political pain.85 It would do so by
returning to a formalist interpretation of separation of powers, in
which Congress investigates matters that implicate the public in-
terest with the objective of either passing ameliorative legislation
82. Michael B. Rappaport, Replacing Independent Counsels with Congressional
Investigations, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1596 (2000).
83. This will be discussed in further detail in Part III.C. See infra text accompanying
notes 105-09.
84. Nicholas C. Stewart, The Kennedy-Hoffa Showdown: Why Congressional Investigations
Need Greater Powers and Procedural Leeway than Prosecutions, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 607,
629-31 (2011).
85. The President has the power to appoint “ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, judges of the Supreme Court,” but no similar authority over members of Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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or simply raising public consciousness concerning existing problems.
This proposal would also operate more expeditiously and more
publicly than either the independent counsel or the special counsel,
making both the President and those investigating him more ac-
countable to the people.
A. Shields Investigations from Presidential Interference
Most Americans feel that investigations of the President should
be allowed to proceed without presidential interference,86 and the
possibility that a special counsel might be fired before an investiga-
tion has been completed is probably the preeminent concern for
people who are not constitutional lawyers.87 This proposal would
address that concern by making Congress the party responsible for
investigations of the executive, instead of a special prosecutor
working within the executive branch.88 After all, while the Constitu-
tion invests Congress with the authority to remove the President
through the impeachment process, it does not confer any similar
power upon the President to unilaterally dismiss members of Con-
gress.89 This lopsided allocation of removal power indicates that the
legislature remains the most secure place for investigations of the
executive to reside.
In drafting the EGA, Congress found it difficult to circumvent the
constitutional authority conferred upon the President by the Ap-
pointments Clause over hiring and firing inside the executive
branch.90 Ultimately, Congress “solved” this problem by simply
ignoring it, and gave portions of both the executive and judicial
86. As of October 2018, 63 percent of voters believed that Special Counsel Mueller should
not be fired. See Lisa Hagen, Poll: Majority Opposes Trump Firing Rosenstein, THE HILL
(Oct. 1, 2018, 5:01 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/409347-poll-majority-opposes-
trump-firing-rosenstein [https://perma.cc/G6JN-BHHD].
87. For example, see the bipartisan legislation (of dubious constitutionality) that was
introduced in the Senate to shield Mueller from dismissal. Brian Murphy, Tillis Draws Fire
from Right While Pushing Bill to Protect Special Counsel from Firing, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Aug. 7, 2017, 8:51 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/politics-
columns-blogs/under-the-dome/article165885777.html [https://perma.cc/Q7XW-F9C2].
88. See supra Part II.C.
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
90. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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branches roles in the appointment of an independent counsel91 due
to a misguided assumption that blurring constitutional lines was
equivalent to erasing them.92 The Supreme Court majority in
Morrison held that the resulting statute did not infringe on the
President’s appointment authority to an impermissible extent;93
Justice Scalia, as discussed previously, argued that any diminution
of the President’s appointment authority was inherently unconsti-
tutional.94 This proposal would sidestep the Appointments Clause
debate entirely by declining to place investigatory authority in any
individual whom the President has the constitutional authority to
fire. President Nixon’s dismissal of the Watergate special prosecu-
tor instigated the contemporary angst over investigatory indepen-
dence,95 and this proposal would effectively obviate that most basic
concern.
B. Satisfies the Constitutional Separation of Powers
This proposal also addresses the constitutional issue identified by
Justice Scalia in his Morrison dissent. Fear of the consequences of
intermingling executive, legislative, and judicial powers in a single
body has existed since the beginning of the Republic96 and provided
the primary motivation underlying the separation of powers en-
shrined in the Constitution.97 The special counsel in its current
form raises no separation of powers concerns, but the recent effort
91. 28 U.S.C. § 592(g)(1) (2012).
92. Although, it is unclear if Congress considered the constitutional implications at all.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
93. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659-60 (1988).
94. See id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. “[A]fter more than 25 years of covering presidents, I am still surprised that his
successors did not fully comprehend the depth of distrust left by Nixon.... These presidents
were inhabiting a new world, but they often seemed not to recognize it.” See BOB WOODWARD,
SHADOW: FIVE PRESIDENTS AND THE LEGACY OF WATERGATE xiv (Simon & Schuster eds., 1999).
96. James Madison famously argued that “[a]mbition must be made to counteract
ambition,” a fundamental tenet of the American constitutional system that this proposal
strives to emulate. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
97. Scalia identified the central question of the Morrison case as involving “[t]he allocation
of power among Congress, the President, and the courts in such fashion as to preserve the
equilibrium the Constitution sought to establish.” Morrison, 487 U.S. at 699 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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to make dismissal contingent upon review by a three-judge panel98
indicates that the anti-executive impulse that inspired the EGA still
exists.99
Transferring responsibility for investigations of the executive to
Congress would not be a new innovation, but rather a return to
historical practice. Before Watergate, special counsels were the
exception and not the rule, and Congress regularly conducted in-
vestigations into executive branch misconduct.100 The collisions
that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s101 were the result of the re-
cently created independent counsel encroaching on Congress’s orig-
inal turf,102 and Congress eventually ceded that ground without
much of a fight.103 Members of Congress might want to shirk the
responsibility of investigating the executive (and the controversy
that normally accompanies such endeavors), but requiring the leg-
islature to once again take the lead would allow voters the opportu-
nity to hold both the President and his interlocutors accountable at
the ballot box—an opportunity that voters currently lack.
C. Ensures Expedient Public Disclosure of Relevant Facts
Congressional investigations are not only structurally distinct
from special counsel probes—they also differ in their objectives and
98. Special Counsel Integrity Act, S. 1741, 115th Cong. § 2(d)(2) (2017).
99. The independent counsel provisions of the EGA were applicable to only a narrow
subset of executive branch officials. They were designed to ameliorate concerns about
“conflicts of interest on the part of the President, the Vice President, [and] the Attorney
General.” 123 CONG. REC. 20,957 (1977) (statement of Sen. Percy).
100. “Congressional oversight of the Executive continued throughout the nineteenth
century. Yet, while disputes were common, the power of Congress to engage in such
investigations was ... generally not questioned.” Marshall, supra note 55, at 788.
101. For further discussion of the problems inherent in parallel investigations, see supra
notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
102. The constitutional system created by the Framers indicates they understood that
“Congress’s power to investigate plays a critical role in the checks and balances of U.S.
democracy” and that “the Executive Branch could not be trusted to correct itself.” Marshall,
supra note 55, at 799-800.
103. In 1998, Congress deferred to the statutory prescription of the EGA in relying on the
independent counsel to bring them evidence of impeachable offenses committed by the
President—according to House Judiciary Chairman Henry Hyde, “[The independent counsel]
is here to help us adduce and understand the facts.” Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson
Clinton, President of the United States: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 3 (1998) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
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their procedures. While special counsels function as criminal pros-
ecutors who gather information in an attempt to determine whether
to issue indictments, a congressional investigation aims to “bring to
light social conditions that require corrections, [and] to expose
wrongdoing.”104 Hence, a congressional investigation will not always
end with the wrongdoers behind bars—but it will end with the
public knowing which individuals have done wrong.
Because a witness in a congressional investigation does not face
the same potential for harm to his or her constitutional rights as a
defendant in a criminal case, witnesses receive fewer constitutional
protections.105 Combined with the need for members to quickly
amass knowledge about complex subjects with which they might be
totally unfamiliar, it becomes clear why “the sovereign legislative
power armed with the right of subpoena and search” is essential to
the conduct of Congressional investigations.106 Congress enjoys the
benefit of a plethora of tools that make congressional investigations
easier than criminal prosecutions—from subpoenas that are pro-
tected from judicial injunction as long as “Congress is acting
pursuant to a valid legislative purpose,” to the power to immunize
cooperating witnesses and hold recalcitrant ones in contempt.107
While these powers have often provoked criticism from witness
advocates,108 the Supreme Court has long affirmed Congress’s right
to make use of them.109
Congress’s recognized authority to conduct executive oversight,
coupled with the expansive powers necessary to effectively do the
job, make Congress the ideal forum for quickly gathering informa-
tion about alleged executive branch misconduct and revealing it to
the public. In contrast to the slow and secretive progress of special
104. James Hamilton et al., Congressional Investigations: Politics and Process, 44 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (2007).
105. “[A]ttempting to rationalize broad investigative powers, Felix Frankfurter wrote that
unlike criminal trials, [congressional] hearings do not place a man’s liberty interest at stake.”
Stewart, supra note 84, at 627.
106. Id. (quoting Hugo L. Black, Inside a Senate Investigation, HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 1936,
at 275, 276).
107. Id. at 617-18 (quoting Hamilton et al., supra note 104, at 1126).
108. “Some commentators believe these aforementioned powers are so sweeping that, for
witnesses, the question is not whether this is going to be a bad day—it is how bad.” Id. at 618.
109. For an early affirmation of Congress’s power to imprison those it has held in contempt,
see Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227-28 (1821).
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counsel investigations,110 Congress can expeditiously immunize
witnesses and compel testimony so as to expose wrongdoing inside
of the executive branch to the American electorate and let the
people decide how to respond. One former President even acknowl-
edged that “[i]t is the proper duty of a representative body to look
diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about
what it sees.... The informing function of Congress should be
preferred even to its legislative function.”111 The government would
be more accountable to its citizens if Congress embraced that
conception of its role today.
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS
This Note has focused thus far on how this reform proposal would
address the problems inherent in the current system of executive
investigations, but there are a number of pertinent counterargu-
ments that range from the structural to the practical. The strongest
will be addressed here.
A. Violation of the “Take Care” Clause
The Take Care Clause appears in the enumeration of the Presi-
dent’s responsibilities in Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution,
and mandates that the President “shall take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.”112 This directive will be familiar to any Amer-
ican schoolchild taught the most basic breakdown of separation of
powers: Congress passes laws, the courts interpret them, and the
President enforces them.113 The Take Care Clause has traditionally
been interpreted to mean that the President holds the sole responsi-
bility for determining how to enforce federal law.114 This exclusive
110. The special counsel is only required to provide updates to the Attorney General and
has no obligation to inform the public of any developments in an investigation. See 28 C.F.R.
§ 600.9(b) (2018).
111. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (1913).
112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
113. “I am here to see that the laws get done, the ringmaster of the government!” School-
house Rock!, Three Ring Government, YOUTUBE (Nov. 2, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=tEPd98CbbMk [https://perma.cc/7AJ8-NYJD].
114. “[The Take Care Clause] contemplate[s] a role for the President, and for no one else,
in the administration of the government.” Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
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mandate could pose a problem for the plan outlined in this Note: if
Congress, rather than the DOJ, is given the primary responsibility
for investigating misconduct within the executive branch, does this
constitute a transfer of law enforcement authority from the ex-
ecutive to the legislature that runs afoul of the Take Care Clause?
It is unlikely that this proposal violates the Take Care Clause,
because it is not a recommendation for Congress to shoulder the
responsibility for criminal law enforcement as it is applied to
individuals working in the executive branch; rather, it is a proposal
for the DOJ to exercise their prosecutorial discretion and defer to
Congress in this limited subset of investigations. Congress never
has and never will enforce federal criminal law.115 Congressional
investigations are not conducted with the expectation that members
of Congress will ever prosecute lawbreakers; they are conducted in
order to expeditiously provide information to both Congress and the
public concerning the failure of executive branch officials to properly
follow federal law.116 When a member of the executive branch breaks
the law, it is not only a crime—it is also potentially an impeachable
offense.117
This category of offense lies squarely within the authority of
Congress to investigate, though not to punish. Adoption of this
proposal would therefore require an uncomfortable trade-off: Amer-
icans would have to decide that they would rather quickly discover
evidence of wrongdoing that they could then subsequently punish
at the ballot box, instead of waiting an indeterminate period of time
for a special counsel investigation to conclude and issue criminal
indictments.118 If Congress adopted this proposal, executive branch
lawbreakers would be granted immunity from prosecution in ex-
change for their public testimony regarding the criminal acts in
which they participated. Hence, Congress would not be invading the
President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 582 (1994).
115. “[P]rovid[ing] federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime” is one of the
primary responsibilities of the DOJ. About DOJ, supra note 7.
116. “[The congressional investigative power] encompasses inquiries concerning the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.” Stewart,
supra note 84, at 616 (quoting Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957)).
117. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
118. This concern will be addressed more fully in Part IV.C below.
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executive’s monopoly on federal law enforcement authority—the
Attorney General would simply exercise her legitimate prosecutorial
discretion in recognition of the public interest in full disclosure
when she decides to notify the Senate Majority Leader of credible
evidence of wrongdoing.
B. Unworkability Due to Extreme Congressional Partisanship
Any proposal to give Congress greater responsibility in any realm
raises the obvious concern of partisanship. Studies of congressional
partisanship indicate that the ideological gap between members of
the two parties has widened steadily since the early 1980s.119 This
increased ideological polarization has driven an increase in party-
line voting in Congress, which in recent years has become the rule
rather than the exception.120 It is reasonable to wonder whether
anything would change if Congress were faced with a referral from
the Attorney General concerning executive misconduct, or whether
the tendency towards partisanship would only be exacerbated. Can
a bipartisan Senate committee be trusted to reveal the truth, or will
partisan pressures stymie any such effort?
Historical experience indicates that fears about partisanship
crippling congressional investigations are overblown.121 The Senate
119. “[I]n the 111th Congress, for the first time in modern history, in both the House and
Senate, the most conservative Democrat is slightly more liberal than the most liberal
Republican. This is another way of saying that the degree of overlap between the parties in
Congress is zero.” THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS:
HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF
EXTREMISM 45 (2016).
120. “As recently as the early 1970s, party unity voting was around 60% but today it is
closer to 90% in both the House and Senate.” David Davenport, A Growing Cancer on
Congress: The Curse of Party-Line Voting, FORBES (Dec. 13, 2017, 8:38 AM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2017/12/13/a-growing-cancer-on-congress-the-curse-of-party-
line-voting/ [https://perma.cc/L7EA-3TCL].
121. Partisanship may actually prompt a proliferation of questionably motivated con-
gressional investigations. For criticism of House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy’s comments
tying Hillary Clinton’s sinking approval rating to the work of the House Select Committee on
Benghazi, see E.J. Dionne, Jr., Opinion, Kevin McCarthy’s Truthful Gaffe on Benghazi, WASH.
POST (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kevin-mccarthys-truthful-
gaffe/2015/09/30/f12a9fac-67a8-11e5-8325-a42b5a459b1e_story.html [https://perma.cc/FZ6K-
7MES].
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Watergate Committee included three Republican members,122 two
of whom were successfully reelected123 after their well-publicized
participation in an investigation of a President of their own party.124
The controversial vote in the House of Representatives to adopt two
articles of impeachment for President Bill Clinton did not split
perfectly along party lines, and the members of each party who did
“defect” were not subsequently punished by their constituents.125
Even in today’s rancorous political environment, academic measures
of bipartisan cooperation in Congress show recent improvement.126
Hence, there appear to be sufficient incentives for members of Con-
gress to break with a President of their own party without suffering
adverse electoral consequences.
But if partisanship truly exerts a stronger pull on members of
Congress today than it did in years past, there are practical steps
that Congress can take to ensure that the investigative process re-
mains nonpartisan. McKay Smith and Alan Wehbé have proposed
an innovative plan that delegates the initial grunt work of congres-
sional investigations, such as subpoenaing documents and provid-
ing comparative historical research, to career civil servants in the
122. Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (The Watergate Committee), U.S.
SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/ artandhistory/history/common/investigations/Watergate.htm
[https://perma.cc/APM6-9WR6].
123. They appeared to suffer no partisan penalty from their constituents: Watergate
Committee ranking member Howard Baker won 83.44 percent of the GOP vote in his next
primary. See TN US Senate—R Primary, OUR CAMPAIGNS (Jan. 10, 2008, 3:26 PM), https://
www.ourcampaigns.com/RaceDetail.html [https://perma.cc/3J29-CSKP].
124. The third resigned from the Senate in the wake of criminal indictments for an un-
related bribery charge. See Tom Leithauser, Ex-Senator Ed Gurney Dies, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(May 22, 1996), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-1996-05-22-9605211544-story.
html [https://perma.cc/UEQ6-XZ9M].
125. On Article I, five members of each party defected; on Article III, twelve Republicans
voted nay and five Democrats voted yea. See Alison Mitchell, Impeachment: The Overview—
Clinton Impeached; He Faces a Senate Trial, 2d in History; Vows to Do Job Till Term’s ‘Last
Hour,’ N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/20/us/impeachment-over
view-clinton-impeached-he-faces-senate-trial-2d-history-vows-job.html [https://perma.cc/32D4-
LJ2G].
126. In 2019, Bipartisan Index scores produced by Georgetown’s McCourt School of Public
Policy “improved for the third straight Congress after bottoming out in 2011-2012.” The Lugar
Center and McCourt School Unveil Bipartisan Index Rankings for 115th Congress, MCCOURT
SCH. OF PUB. POL’Y, https://mccourt.georgetown.edu/Bipartisan-Index-Rating [https://perma.
cc/VR8D-SWGV].
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various offices of inspectors general and the Government Account-
ability Office (GAO).127 
Inspectors general are creations of the legislative branch who are
stationed in various executive branch departments to perform “au-
dits, inspections, and investigations of federal government programs
and operations” and who report their findings “concerning fraud[ ]
and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies” directly to
Congress.128 The GAO is a legislative branch entity that Congress
created in order to aid it in “investigat[ing] ... all matters related to
the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds” and
which is not populated by elected officials or partisan staff.129 These
entities, along with other legislative branch organizations such as
the Congressional Research Service, provide an in-house source of
nonpartisan information that Congress regularly uses to inform its
decision-making and which can be pressed into service for investi-
gations of the Executive.130 The ultimate decision concerning what
to do with the information uncovered—including whether impeach-
ment or censure is warranted—would remain the exclusive province
of the elected members of Congress (inevitably guided by the
opinions of their constituents),131 but the civil service can lay the
factual groundwork for that determination.
The success of the proposal outlined in this Note does not depend
on the adoption of McKay and Wehbé’s specific plan; it is offered
merely to show that useful legislative branch resources do already
exist, and can be utilized without asking members of Congress to
distract their attention from other important matters during the
information-gathering stages of an investigation. Professor Thomas
Merrill of Columbia Law School criticizes the idea of using inspec-
tors general for this work because they only have the power to issue
administrative subpoenas for the production of documents—not the
127. See McKay Smith & Alan Wehbé, A Bipartisan Vehicle for Change: Proposing a Novel
Investigative Framework Designed to Improve and Empower Congressional Investigations, 29
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 254-57 (2018).
128. Id. at 254. For a complete elucidation of the role of inspectors general in the federal
government, see id. at 254-55.
129. Id. at 255. The GAO staff includes “economists, social scientists, accountants, public
policy analysts, attorneys, and computer experts,” bringing a broad range of expertise to bear
on any investigation. Id.
130. See id.
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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power to compel testimony or grant immunity.132 But Congress does
have the requisite authority, and can bring it to bear on executive
branch witnesses when the investigative work performed by non-
partisan civil servants has revealed that they might have helpful
testimony to share. One can criticize this proposal as “substitut[ing]
one form of political dependence for another,”133 but when it comes
to investigations of the executive, political dependence on the leg-
islature is always less dangerous than dependence on the executive
himself. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that investigations
directed by Congress would result in more overall partisan distor-
tion than the prevailing model.134
C. Public Accountability over Criminal Punishment
Finally, to address a concern briefly noted above,135 the adoption
of this proposal would require a value judgment that many observ-
ers might find distasteful. It would require Americans to decide that
revealing the truth is more important than levying punishment on
guilty parties—in other words, that it is more important to “prevent
ongoing and future harm” than “to redress past wrongs.”136 This is
not a choice that everyone will be willing to make, because Ameri-
cans generally believe that crime should be punished.137 But “[s]ocial
purposes can never be single or simple, or held unqualifiedly to the
exclusion of all other social purposes; and an effort to make them so
can result only in the sacrifice of other values which also are
132. For Professor Merrill’s critique of the proposal, see Thomas W. Merrill, Beyond the
Independent Counsel: Evaluating the Options, 43 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1047, 1077-78 (1999).
133. Id. at 1077.
134. For one notable example, compare President Trump’s repeated characterizations of
the special counsel investigation as a “witch hunt” with his conclusion upon the release of the
final report that “[i]t’s 100 percent the way it should have been.” See Rebecca Morin, Trump
Says Mueller Acted Honorably in Russia Probe, POLITICO (Mar. 25, 2019, 1:21 PM), https://
www.politico.com/story/2019/03/25/trump-mueller-acted-honorably-1235226 [https://perma.cc/
7JWU-GCH5].
135. See supra Part IV.A.
136. Stewart, supra note 84, at 609. 
137. In October 2016, a Gallup poll found that a plurality of Americans (45 percent) felt
that “this country is ... not tough enough” in its handling of crime. An additional 35 percent
said the balance is “about right.” Crime, GALLUP (Oct. 5-9, 2016), https://news.gallup.com/
poll/1603/crime.aspx [https://perma.cc/92RT-PNY7].
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important.”138 The value of expeditiously exposing executive wrong-
doing to the public is of overwhelming importance, and outweighs
the valid desire to levy criminal punishment on lawbreakers. After
all, a crime cannot be punished—whether by criminal sanction or
electoral defeat—unless it is first exposed.
When the President or one of his aides commits a crime, that
violation of the law is not merely a matter of concern for prosecutors
in the relevant jurisdiction; it is a matter of concern for the entire
country. It reflects a breakdown in the ordinary political process
and demands rectification from those who are in a position to
address the problem. The investigative role of Congress “includes
surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the
purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them.”139 By conducting
investigations into allegations of criminal wrongdoing within the
executive branch, Congress is performing its judicially acknowl-
edged oversight function. It performs this function with a toolkit
broader than that of the ordinary federal prosecutor, because the
goal of a congressional inquiry is not criminal prosecution—it is
the rectification of an existing problem, whether by statute or by
“sunlight.”140
In response to criticism of the labor racketeering inquiries of
the 1950s, congressional investigator Robert Kennedy justified his
aggressive tactics by explaining that “[n]o organization, union or
business ... has a greater effect on the community life in this country
[than organized crime].”141 What was true of the mob in the 1950s
is doubly true of the presidency in all times and all places. If alle-
gations of executive misconduct are overblown, then a congressional
inquiry can quickly put the matter to rest and allow the President
to get on with the business of the country. But if an inquiry does
uncover criminal activity within the executive branch, then the
public deserves to know that as well. Congress, as the only institu-
tion charged with the solemn authority to remove a lawbreaking
138.  Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
401 (1958).
139.  Stewart, supra note 84, at 616.
140. In the words of Justice Brandeis, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman.” Justice Louis D. Brandeis, BRANDEIS U., https://
www.brandeis.edu/legacyfund/bio.html [https://perma.cc/7RKZ-DD4H].
141.  Stewart, supra note 84, at 613-14.
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President from office, is also the only institution equipped to
respond.
CONCLUSION
This Note argues that Congress should take the lead in future
investigations of the executive, and that the various attempts to
create some form of special counsel within the executive branch
should be abandoned. The impulse towards innovation in investiga-
tory processes that we have seen since Watergate is understandable
but misguided; the institution best equipped to handle future in-
vestigations of the executive is the same one that handled them
effectively in the past. Congress has poked its collective nose into
executive affairs since the Washington presidency, and the Supreme
Court has consistently upheld its right to do so as a concomitant
aspect of the legislative power.142 The Watergate scandal frightened
legal scholars and the American public into believing that Congress
was no longer capable of performing this essential function,143 but
in fact Congress did its job perfectly during Watergate. The Senate
Watergate Committee exposed the existence of the White House
tapes which were subsequently subpoenaed by the special prosecu-
tor,144 and Richard Nixon ultimately resigned his office because it
appeared likely that he would be impeached145—not because he
feared criminal indictment.
Congress has the necessary tools—to issue subpoenas, take
testimony, grant immunity, and hold witnesses in contempt146—to
continue performing this vital role. Partisanship has not prevented
it from doing so in the past, but if partisanship presented an
142. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
144. See James M. Naughton, Surprise Witness Butterfield, Ex-Aide at White House, Tells
of Listening Devices, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/07/17/
archives/surprise-witness-butterfield-exaide-at-white-house-tells-of.html [https://perma.cc/
9XQH-W4YD].
145. “Mr. Nixon said he decided he must resign when he concluded that he no longer had
‘a strong enough political base in the Congress’ to make it possible for him to complete his
term of office.” Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Resigns, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 1974), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/080974-3.htm [https://
perma.cc/R6ML-XE4L]. 
146. See Stewart, supra note 84, at 616.
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impediment in the future then the initial stages of fact-gathering
can be handled by nonpartisan civil servants working for the
legislative branch.147 But the ultimate decision of constitutional
import—how to respond once a President’s misconduct has been
publicly exposed—has only ever rested in the hands of Congress.148
The branch that the Founders deemed sufficiently independent to
make the decision to impeach is also capable of handling the more
mundane work of investigating allegations of wrongdoing. No new
law is required in order for Congress to continue performing this
work; the special counsel was created by DOJ regulations, and can
be eliminated using the same unilateral rulemaking process (and,
as Lawrence Walsh learned to his chagrin during the Iran-Contra
hearings, the special counsel has no authority to issue orders to
Congress anyway149). The power to investigate the executive branch
has been Congress’s from the beginning, and can be theirs once
again if only they decide that they are ready to wield it.
Andrew B. Pardue*
147. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
148. “The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
149. For a full discussion of the Iran-Contra hearings, see supra notes 67-69 and accom-
panying text.
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